University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Center for International Education Faculty
Publications

Center for International Education

2004

USE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
TO DELIVER SOCIAL SERVICES:
ADVANTAGES AND DRAWBACKS
Bjorn Nordtveit
University of Massachusetts - Amherst, bjorn@educ.umass.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cie_faculty_pubs
Part of the Instructional Media Design Commons, International and Comparative Education
Commons, and the Other Education Commons
Recommended Citation
Nordtveit, Bjorn, "USE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS TO DELIVER SOCIAL SERVICES: ADVANTAGES AND
DRAWBACKS" (2004). Center for International Education Faculty Publications. 38.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cie_faculty_pubs/38

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Education at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Center for International Education Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

USE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS TO DELIVER SOCIAL
SERVICES: ADVANTAGES AND DRAWBACKS

Bjorn Harald Nordtveit, PhD
bnordtveit@hotmail.com

Washington DC, October 2005

NORDTVEIT/EFA 2006/PPP

Table of contents

Acronyms ....................................................................................................................... 3
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 4
2. Public delivery of services versus public-private partnerships: the debate ............... 7
3. Civil society defined .................................................................................................. 9
4. Civil society as a service delivery agent: the "faire-faire model" in Senegal ......... 11
5. Exporting the faire-faire model: country cases ........................................................ 14
6. Advantages and drawbacks of the public-private partnership model ...................... 16
7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 19
Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 22

2

NORDTVEIT/EFA 2006/PPP

Acronyms
AGETIP (Agence d’Exécution des Travaux d’Intérêt Publique): Contract managing,
or “outsourcing” agency in Senegal
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
DAEB (Direction de l’Alphabétisation et de l’Education de Base): Department for
Literacy and Basic Education at the Ministry of Education
EFA

Education For All

FONAFEF
(Le Fonds National pour l’Alphabétisation et l’Education Non Formelle)
National Foundation for Literacy and Non-formale Education (in Burkina
Faso)
GIE

(Groupement d’Interêt Economique): Local for-profit association

GTZ

(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) German Technical
Cooperation for Development

ICR

Implementation Completion Report (the World Bank’s project completion
report)

IZZ-DVV (Institut für Internationale Zusammenarbeit des Deutschen VolkshochschulVerbandes) German Association for Adult Education
IFC

International Finance Corporation

IMF

International Monetary Fund

NGO Non-governmental Organization
PPP

Public-private Partnership

SAR

(World Bank) Staff Appraisal Report (equivalent to a UN Project Document)

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(www.unesco.org)
WDR World Development Report (a yearly World Bank publication)
WLP Women's Literacy Project (World-Bank financed literacy project in Senegal)
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1. Introduction
Literacy programs are frequently subdivided into two main types of programs: those
focusing on unschooled children and out-of-school youth, and those focusing on
adults. The first category frequently strives to provide equivalent education to primary
schooling, and may even offer the possibility of reintegrating the learner into formal
schooling at the secondary level. The adult literacy classes are mostly designed for
people in the 15-40-years age group, although it is more and more recognized that
older adults also wish to and need to learn to read and write. Literacy classes can
usually be characterized by their short duration and their attempt to teach a maximum
of literacy and basic skills in a limited period of time. Adult literacy programs
commonly employ one of three main types of implementation strategies, such as:


Mass literacy campaigns



Government, IO, or NGO funded and implemented projects



Government, IO, or NGO funded projects which are implemented by service
providers

Mass literacy campaigns are typically implemented as a part of the political agenda of
new (and often socialist) movements: "campaign has about it a sense of urgency and
combativeness. It is politically 'hot.' It is the most important thing that needs to be
done at a particular point in the history of a nation. It is planned expedition or a
crusade" (Bhola, 1999, p. 288). As their name suggests, the campaigns are
characterized by large-scale interventions, often touching a large part of a country’s
population. For example, the literacy campaign in Cuba in 1961, over a nine-month
period, organized and transported more than 250,000 people all over the island, to
teach literacy to the island’s large illiterate population. The campaign was not only
used for literacy instruction, but was also used as a political tool to bring the
revolution to the most remote areas of the country (Carnoy & Samoff, 1990). Some of
the politically "loaded" campaigns took place in USSR (1919-1939), Vietnam (19451977), China (1950s-1980s), Cuba (1961), Burma (1960s-1980s), Tanzania (19711981), and Zimbabwe (1983-). In the 1990s, the two most significant literacy
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campaigns may be the Total Literacy-Universal Elementary Education Campaigns of
India, and South Africa's Adult Basic Education and training initiative (Bhola, 1999).
This latter was largely implemented in cooperation with civil society and largely
funded by the European Union. As opposed to earlier mass literacy campaigns, these
initiatives were not a part of a revolutionary movement.
Mass literacy campaigns have often proved difficult to implement in regions lacking
revolutionary fervor, and has currently lost much of its former popularity. Also, the
effectiveness of mass literacy campaigns as a tool for literacy has been questioned. It
is increasingly recognized that the mass literacy approach may be of too short
duration to make a sustainable effect on the population, and also mass interventions
frequently lack post-literacy initiatives that are necessary to ensure functional literacy.
In non-socialist countries, literacy education has traditionally been delivered through
state and NGO programs. These programs in most cases have a stated purpose of
alleviating poverty through providing a package of basic knowledge to poor and
vulnerable population groups. Small-scale literacy projects can also be used as a
political tool. The Brazilian educator Paulo Freire (1921 – 1997) contended that
literacy education should be conceived as informed action that is not politically
neutral. It should be a tool, not only to develop literacy skills, but also to develop
consciousness on the possibility of transforming society (Freire, 2001). Therefore,
small-scale literacy projects should have a clear political mandate to promote social
justice. As opposed to socialist mass-literacy campaigns and Freirian-inspired literacy
classes, many of today’s literacy projects do not have any explicit (or stated) political
agenda. Rather, they have poverty alleviation as their stated agenda, and their
ideological agenda (if any) remains implicit.
Nearly all publicly funded literacy programs before the 1970s were implemented
through civil servants’ direct involvement in the service delivery. Literacy education
was also usually characterized by its use of volunteers or low-paid (and often
formerly unemployed) literate people to teach classes. Also, in some countries,
literacy education was not prioritized by the state, and there were few governmentfunded literacy and non-formal education programs. Instead, the government counted
on civil society associations and especially NGOs to perform this service.
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In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Thatcher and Reagan founded their economic
policies on individual liberty and the restriction of government. The U.K and U.S
model were rapidly exported to the development world. Delivery of literacy, which
was already partly using non-governmental means (i.e., few countries had civil
servants serving exclusively as literacy teachers) increasingly became a market-based
service. Outsourcing and public-private partnerships (PPPs) became a commonly
used method for setting up literacy services from the 1980s.
Public-private partnerships can be defined as a risk-sharing relationship that is
grounded on a shared objective of the public and the private sectors. Typically, such
relationship is based on a contract between a private organization and the state for a
publicly funded service (see: Edinvest’s Public-private partnership toolkit, IFC).
Such partnership for literacy delivery may present certain advantages over
outsourcing (in which the government usually subcontracts with a provider to perform
a pre-defined service), insomuch as the provider organization has, supposedly, the
same objectives as the government, and that it is therefore willing to take risks. These
risks can be associated with the providers’ investment in doing background research
for the program proposal, without knowing whether their efforts will result in any
funding. Risks can also be associated with financing, e.g., performance-based
contracts may lead to financial loss if the service delivery for one reason or another
fails (IMF, 2004; Edinvest; Nordtveit, 2005). The government also bears some risks,
insomuch as it needs to carry the political risk of delivery failure of the providers (this
latter can be due to the providers’ embezzlement, or lack of skill).
It should be emphasized that the highest economic risk, however, is ultimately borne
by the consumers, since faulty delivery could be expensive in terms of opportunity
costs to them (Nordtveit, 2005). Economic and risk evaluation of literacy has a
tendency to focus on the public institutions’ and providers’ risks, without taking
sufficiently into account the consumers’ opportunity costs. In some cases, the lack of
calculating the consumers’ risks results in low-quality literacy classes, since it may be
found that it is less costly to invest in inexpensive courses than in high-quality and
more costly courses, although the latter would prove less risky for the consumer. The
following sections outline the debate on public versus private service delivery and
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discuss the notion of civil society and its relation to PPP. Furthermore, advantages
and drawbacks of PPPs are examined through a country case study.

2. Public delivery of services versus public-private partnerships: the debate
The neo-liberal school of thought (based on neoclassical economics) argues that
public-private partnerships in delivery of literacy (and of other social services) are
more effective than state-delivered programs. The alleged cost effectiveness of using
public-private partnerships is based on several arguments. It is maintained that
because private provision uses competitive selection of providers, it is more effective
than state provision. Moreover, the providers can be held accountable for their
actions, while it is it is difficult for the government to be held accountable for its own
actions.
Many governments also set up public-private partnerships because they want to
concentrate on certain key sectors. They use private providers to deliver auxiliary
services such as adult literacy, areas where they believe that the private sector has a
comparative advantage and where risk can be shared (Harper, 2000). Also, in many
countries, the state institutions are corrupt, and it can be argued that partnerships are
more effective in the fight against corruption, insomuch as it is easier to fight
corruption in private companies and NGOs than to fight corruption inside state firms
and agencies. Once an activity is privatized or outsourced, the government's control
over it weakens, and so do the possibilities for corruption (Shleifer, 1998). There is
no certainty, however, that outsourcing service implementation to NGOs will reduce
corruption: “It is often stated that privatization or NGOization would reduce
corruption but this is seldom rigorously evaluated. Private providers and NGOs can
also siphon off or waste funds and perform poorly in terms of service delivery” (Azfar
& Zinnes, 2003, p. 16).
One key to success for public-private partnerships, it has been argued by the
neoliberal school of thought, is to make providers accountable towards the recipients
of services. This is called a “short route of accountability” as opposed to governmentimplemented services in which the local implementing agent is accountable towards
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the policy-making institution, e.g., the Ministry of Education (World Bank/WDR,
2003). The short route of accountability allegedly makes it possible to implement
rapid corrections to services, insomuch as the consumers can interact directly with
providers to improve the delivery. On the other hand, in the long route of
accountability, any service delivery problem needs to be addressed through
government intervention, which may take longer time and may be less effective.
Some studies on public-private partnerships, however, have pointed out that the short
path of accountability does not work unless the consumers have both free access to
information and access to a market of providers, and that they therefore have the
possibility of changing provider (Nordtveit, 2005).
Critical theorists contend that partnerships may lead to ineffective cost-cutting
practices in which the private provider organizations offer low-quality services.1 Also
it is argued that such methods are merely attempting to transfer the responsibility of
social services to the poor, and thus also transfer the blame of poverty to the poor. The
outcome of PPPs, critical theorist argue, is in many cases to offer poor services to
poor people.
Lack of quality can in some cases be addressed through the following measures:
1: Making it possible for the learners to switch suppliers of literacy services.2 This
will prevent the providers from acting in a monopolistic way in the concerned
communities.
2: Reputation-building among providers. For example, if the selection is partly based
on past achievements, the providers would strive to obtain good results, and to build
their reputation as a supplier of high-quality services.
3: Making use of non profit organizations as providers. Commonly, non profit
organizations use their surplus to improve lives of the organization’s employees, and
sometimes when the organization is socially motivated, even to increase quality of the
literacy courses (Schleifer, 1998).
1

In this context, low quality is understood as the lack of learning outcomes, especially in the field of
literacy.
2

This can be realized, for example, through the government monitoring of the program at the local level.
Local authorities can help the community to switch provider in case of unsatisfactory delivery.
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Implementation of literacy courses through public-private partnerships could in many
cases improve quality by a careful design which integrates the above features. In
addition, it is necessary to set up a control and enforcement system that
counterbalances asymmetric information situations, in which the government does not
know how the provider performs (Schleifer, 1998; Nordtveit, 2005). Programs using
public-private partnerships have often needed to set up costly monitoring and
evaluation systems to ensure contract compliance. Even heavy monitoring and
evaluation structures have in many cases resulted in ineffective and unregulated
service implementation, because of public institutions wishing to obtain political
support from the providers. In such a case, there is a misappropriation of publicprivate partnerships, and the system becomes a political tool instead of a means to
combat illiteracy (Nordtveit, 2005). For successful implementation of public-private
partnerships, it is crucial that the government has a shared interest in obtaining a highquality service delivery, and that it sets up an enforcement structure that ensures
contract compliance by the providers (IMF, 2004; Edinvest). An active collaboration
with non-profit organizations and civil society may in some cases help the set-up of a
transparent partnership system and an appropriate enforcement structure.

3. Civil society defined
The term “civil society” is often defined as a set of organized activities that are
independent of the state and economic interests, as a “sphere of social interaction
between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the
family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social
movements, and forms of public communication” (Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. ix).
Many authors, inspired by Tocqueville, argue that civil society is necessary for the
proper functioning of a democracy, since it may relieve some of the state’s
responsibilities, check the state’s power, distribute information, and initiate people
into public life. Based on research in Italy and the U.S., Putnam furthered this
conception of civil society, using the term “social capital” as a measure of
connections and trust among individuals. He argued that a society with a high level of
social capital functions better than a society without it. The level of “connectivity” of
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the society is often measured by the number of people registered in civil society
associations and the number of such associations (Putnam, 2000). Social capital, it is
argued, has a series of positive externalities insomuch as it lowers crime, stimulates
trade, and amplifies mutual trust, thereby leading to economic growth. This has a
clear effect on development and also on development strategies, insomuch as
investment in building social capital is supposed to lead to economic growth (Krishna,
2002).
From the 1990s, many development agencies were influenced by Putnam and began
concentrating their efforts in building social capital (Todaro, 1996). This was often
done through capacity building within existing civil society associations, and also
through various actions intended at increasing the number of civil society
associations. It was argued that the strengthening and creation of civil society would
increase the stock of social capital, and that the increased stock of social capital would
have both economic and political benefits.
In this conjuncture, partnership with civil society quickly became a new buzzword in
the debate on democracy and development. Civil society became an important factor
in the preservation of a good state, and was gradually also involved as an alternative
delivery agent of social services and welfare. In the 1990s, development programs
not only began using civil society organizations for implementation of services, but
development efforts increasingly aimed at strengthening, or even creating civil
society. In this context, the idea of using civil society to implement social services
corresponded both to the idea of building social capital and to Thatcher and Reagan’s
neoliberal economic policies of restricting the scope of the government. The use of
outsourcing and public-private partnerships to civil society associations became
increasingly a preferred method for implementing services in the late 1980s. The
discourse of "civil society" and partnerships as a means towards "good governance"
and service implementation was gradually adapted by the neoliberals. In the early
1990s, this implementation strategy also became a means for implementing social
services (including literacy) in developing countries.
In most definitions, civil society is seen as a set of organized activities that are
independent of the state and economic interests (Cohen & Arato, 1992). In many

10

NORDTVEIT/EFA 2006/PPP

developing countries, however, it can be argued that this definition of civil society
does not accurately apply to the local realities. In Africa, for example, women’s
organizations are often publicly registered as “Economic Interest Groups” and have a
clear for-profit mandate. Other women's associations are part of state-administered
women's association cluster(s). It can be debated whether these associations belong to
civil society.
The current expansion of civil society in Africa is often generated through assistance
from government-financed (or donor-financed) programs which try to stimulate the
creation of social capital. Many of these new associations aim to capture finances
from the state (Thiané, 1996). Generally they are considered as a part of civil society,
albeit they are connected to both the political sphere of the country (since they are
financed by the state), and to the economic sphere (since they were created as a result
of market demand). Civil society in developing countries can therefore in many cases
be considered “as a sphere of social interactions that are linked to political and
economic interests, and composed above all of the sphere of associations, especially
voluntary associations such as traditional grassroots organizations, faith-based groups,
and development-related associations” (Nordtveit, 2005, p. 56).

4. Civil society as a service delivery agent: the "faire-faire model" in Senegal
One type of public-private partnership which subcontracted services to small local
civil society associations has recently been tested out in francophone West Africa.
First used in Senegal, the method became known under the name of faire-faire or
literally, “to make do.” In the Senegalese faire-faire case, about 51% of the literacy
provider associations were local for-profit associations, 25% were local non-profit
associations of different types (language and cultural associations, religious
associations, etc.), and 12% were NGOs (DAEB, 2004). Each year, these associations
submitted project proposals to a selection committee which selected the best
proposals for financing. The budget of the proposals was based on a fixed unit cost
per enrollee. In Senegal, this cost was set at approximately $50 per learner per
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program.3 The classes provided 450 hours of instruction over a 12-18-month period.
In using a fixed unit cost, the competition was not based on how to create the least
costly project, but on how to create the proposal with highest quality. By adapting this
approach, the government hoped to boost the quality of literacy projects. The selected
subprojects were financed by various international agencies, such as the World Bank
and the Canadian International Development Association (CIDA). The role of these
agencies is generally both financial and technical (e.g., they provide some assistance
to the set-up of the public-private partnerships approach).

Figure 1: The faire-faire model – selection and implementation procedures of literacy

Grassroots’ level:
Literacy learners
(most often organized
in Women’s
associations)
Non-formal education
department:
Monitoring and
evaluation

Providers: Design
literacy projects. Upon
financing, they
implement literacy
projects

Selection committee:
Selects the best literacy
project proposals for
financing

Contract-managing
agency: Sets up
contracts with providers
and transfers funds.
Monitors use of funds.

3

A project with 300 participants would therefore obtain US$50 x 300 = $15,000.
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Other countries, such as Burkina Faso, Chad, and Guinea adopted similar models for
implementation of literacy courses. All projects were set-up using the Senegalese
faire-faire model, and used the same processes for selection of literacy providers.
Most public-private partnerships in West Africa used the following steps for selection
of providers and implementation (see figure 1 above):
1. A local civil society association contacts prospective learners in different
communities and defines the needed literacy services for each community
(each literacy course usually serves one village).
2. The civil society association writes a project proposal for implementation of
literacy activities in these communities and submits the proposal to a selection
committee. In most cases, the project summarizes the literacy need for 8 – 20
communities (or villages), and proposes to implement as many literacy
courses.
3. The selection committee (most often composed by representatives from the
state, civil society, and the contract-managing agency) ensures that the
information in the proposal is accurate and decides which projects to finance.
4. A private or parastatal contract-managing agency4 sets up contracts with the
civil society association (henceforth the “provider association”) and transfers a
first installment of funds to the association.
5. The provider association recruits one literacy teacher for each literacy course,
trains the literacy teachers, and sets up a monitoring system for the
implementation of the project.
6. The literacy teacher goes to his or her assigned village and conducts the
literacy classes. Most often, the lessons are divided in two categories; (i)
literacy lessons (teaching reading, writing, and arithmetic skills); (ii) basic

4

Some examples of contract-managing agencies: In Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire, foundations with
representatives from the Government and civil society perform contract managing work. In Senegal, the
contract management is realized by AGETIP, a parastatal organization with an NGO status. In Guinea,
the German Adult Education association IZZ-DVV (Institut für Internationale Zusammenarbeit des
Deutschen Volkshochschul-Verbandes) is being used to perform contract managing work.
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skills lessons (teaching about health, hygiene, and sometimes incomegenerating activities).
7. The government’s non-formal education agency follows up on the
implementation and ensures that the quality of the courses is adequate.
The Senegalese model varies somewhat from the blueprint above. First, during the
selection process, a local control and pre-selection committee checks the accuracy of
the project proposal. The control and pre-selection committee then sends the
proposals that fulfill a minimum set of requirements to a selection committee, which
selects the best proposals. An “approval committee” checks that the selection has
been done in an appropriate and transparent manner, and gives a final clearance for
contracting and financing of the providers.
During implementation, in addition to providing literacy classes, the provider and the
community are in many cases also contracted to build a learning and activities center.
The providers are also contracted to train the literacy teachers, and have clear TORs
for teachers' training. They need to use state-approved instruction materials, to ensure
a certain degree of consistency in terms of literacy provision. The classes are most
often taking place in the learning and activities center, and the providers also supply a
number of books to the community library situated in the center. Also, the villagebased literacy teachers train one or several literate villager(s) to function as a “relais”
or relay person(s), who can continue to conduct literacy classes in the learning and
activities center after the providers’ state financing has ended. These activities are
intended to ensure sustainability of the approach, and also to develop a literate and
enabling environment in the communities.

5. Exporting the faire-faire model: country cases
The Senegalese model has been exported to several other countries, especially in
West Africa. In most cases, these projects are still in the construction or early
implementation phase, and there is yet very little information about their performance.
The countries having used Senegal’s faire-faire strategy as a model include Burkina
Faso, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, and Guinea. In most cases, the initiative to
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use the faire-faire model has been taken by the Government itself, and/or it has been
inspired by the World Bank and other international donor agencies. The reflections
below concern Burkina Faso’s faire-faire project which started in 1999. The Gambia
and Guinea’s adaptation of the faire-faire model is described as it was formulated in
their first procedures manuals. The examples do not reflect any evaluation of the
actual implementation of literacy classes in these countries.
Burkina Faso: In 1999 Burkina Faso developed a public-private partnership
approach based on the Senegalese faire-faire model. Similarly to Senegal, the
approach was built on the action of civil society as implementing agent.
Instead of using a contract-management agency, such as the AGETIP, the Burkina
Faso government decided to create a foundation (Fonds National pour
l’Alphabétisation et l’Education NonFormelle – FONAFEF) for managing contracts
with the provider associations. This foundation manages funding from the
Government and a variety of national and international sources, establishes contracts
and monitors the delivery of the services provided.
The evolution of the civil society sector in Burkina Faso seems to reflect that of
Senegal, insomuch as two types of civil society associations have been particularly
active; (i) national (often religious) nonprofit organizations and (ii) an increasing
number of local “economic interest groups” (GIE) and village associations (Easton,
2004). A survey of provider associations conducted in June 2002 found that the
majority of providers were former clients of literacy programs. Most of the providers
set up and managed less than 20 centers, and about half of them set up less than 10
centers (Easton, 2004).
The Gambia: The Gambia has used the Senegalese partnership version as a model,
and is now in the process of setting up a similar system. However, the Gambian
government has recognized that, using the Senegalese system, civil society
associations possibly will act as a monopoly in the communities. Since there are few
civil society associations in the country, an association may propose its services to
communities that do not have another choice other than to accept the proposal (the
alternative would be to not obtain any literacy project at all). In order to counter-effect
this monopoly tendency, the Gambian government has planned to pre-select the

15

NORDTVEIT/EFA 2006/PPP

communities that are in most need of literacy services. Then, civil society associations
will set up project proposals and compete on obtaining financing for literacy services
in these pre-identified communities. A representative from each community is to
participate in the selection process, to ensure that the community’s interests are taken
into account during selection (Nordtveit, 2004; WB, 2005). In Senegal, many local
administration institutions and the non-formal education department have realized that
the monopoly problem is decreasing the quality of the services – and solutions to this
problem are sought.
Guinea: In Guinea, the main variation from the Senegalese model is linked to the use
of several different unit costs. The department of literacy and non-formal education in
the country wanted to implement different types of projects, which were intended for
different population groups (such as out-of-school children and youth, refugees, street
children, adolescent and adult women, etc.). It was recognized that the cost of
implementing each type of project would necessitate different means of financing, and
that the contracting of providers could not be based on one, fixed fee. Hence, different
unit costs were established, one for each type of program (World Bank, 2002).

6. Advantages and drawbacks of the public-private partnership model
Some of the advantages and drawbacks of implementing literacy services through
public-private partnerships are connected to the following issues:
1. The fixed transaction costs are low, but partially offset by high variable
transaction costs;
2. Asymmetric information in the selection of providers and implementation may
easily lead to moral hazard;
3. The use of public-private partnerships may lower the quality of literacy and
infringe on necessary standards of equity;
4. The market-based provision of literacy may change the nature of civil society,
and decrease its effectiveness in promoting a more just society.
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Transaction costs can be defined as the costs of running the partnership system. They
consist of fixed transaction costs (e.g., the specific investments that are made when
setting up the institutional arrangements), and variable transaction costs (e.g. the
expense of running the partnership system). The former include costs of building
infrastructure for project management and implementation. Since the public-private
partnership projects are mostly using existing infrastructure owned by civil society
associations, the projects’ expenses in fixed transactions costs may be lower than the
fixed transaction costs of a state-run literacy project (for which necessary
infrastructure would in many cases need to be rented or built).5 On the other hand, the
variable transactions costs can be particularly heavy when using public-private
partnerships, because of the costs of ensuring contract compliance. This has been a
major problem in Senegal, where a considerable amount of money has been spent on
a monitoring and on an evaluation system which has largely failed to ensure that the
literacy activities were of adequate quality (World Bank/ICR, 2004). In addition to
supervision and monitoring, the variable transaction costs also include the costs of
information, training and selection of providers, as well as the running costs of the
contract-managing agency (Furubotn & Richter, 2003). Cost advantages by low fixed
transaction costs of public-private partnerships are therefore largely offset by the high
variable transaction costs.
A connected drawback is the principal-agent problem, which arises when the
providers have better knowledge about the operation than the public institutions on
which behalf they act. This is called asymmetric information. Often, the providers
take advantage of the asymmetric information situation, and act in their own interests
instead of acting in the communities’ interest. For example, in Senegal providers
frequently try to earn money from the projects by cutting costs. The term “moral
hazard” is often used to describe situations where self-interested providers are
breaking the required standards of honesty and reliability (as defined by their contract
with the government for project implementation), and circumstances allow them to
get away with it (Kasper & Streit, 1998). Moral hazard has been a common problem
5

This is assuming that civil society infrastructure is excess capacity, or low-cost as compared to state-run
infrastructure. In some cases, it should be noted, this assumption does not hold true (and in some few
cases, the inverse may be true).
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in public-private partnerships, since it has proved difficult to ensure contract
compliance.
At a larger scale, the moral hazard problems question the regulatory function of the
state. In order to successfully implement a public-private partnership, the state needs
to be capable of regulating implementation of literacy services by the private sector
and it also needs to be willing to do so (Nordtveit, 2005). It results that partnerships
cannot be created without solid government support. Public-private partnerships can
therefore rarely be used to compensate for a weak state, or as a way of bypassing the
state. On the contrary, public-private partnerships need a strong and consistent
leadership from the government.
Also, many public-private partnerships lack guidelines to ensure an equitable
distribution of the services. For example, providers usually have a tendency to choose
only the areas and ethnic groups that are easily accessible. The market mechanisms of
the partnership approach, if not corrected, may exclude certain population groups
from service delivery (e.g., nomads, or inhabitants of remote and inaccessible areas).
A redesigned unit cost system could create incentives to reach these populations, and
to create more equitable distribution systems, even if the delivery of literacy services
is market-based. However, the transaction costs of enforcing variable unit costs may
prove them to be ineffectual for use in public-private partnerships.
Critical theorists have been very skeptical to private sector implementation of literacy
(and also to the privatization of other social services). Critical theory has its origin in
a number of schools of thought that critique structures of capitalism, neocolonialism,
patriarchy and racism. A main issue for critical theory is the question of how
education can contribute to create a more just society, rather than only serving as a
means to replicate existing social structures. Theorists belonging to these views
criticize the partnership-based literacy activities, stating that the projects have no aim
at changing society. Rather, they provide the bare minimum of knowledge to the poor.
Such projects, it is contended, will not help the learners to gain social promotion and
recognition, but will replicate existing power structures (and injustice) in society.
Seen from this perspective, the use of partnerships may be considered as a way of
transferring the responsibility of literacy provision from the government to the private
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sector. Building on this argument, it can be deduced that public-private partnerships
change literacy education from being a human need to being a commercial service
offered by private providers to certain populations.
Also, it can be argued that the market based system has a perverse effect on civil
society associations since they are transformed from social capital (trust-based
networks) into private businesses. Hence, it can be claimed that the very mechanisms
that are supposed to create and strengthen civil society (and social capital), corrupt
and weaken it (Nordtveit, 2005).
Policy-makers, when setting up a literacy program, need to consider the
aforementioned debate for and against private or public service delivery. If one
chooses to use private providers for literacy delivery, it is necessary to address market
failures. Some of the shortcomings of public-private partnerships can be fixed
through building government capacity in correcting market flaws (i.e., to build
government regulatory capacity, to set up incentives for working with disadvantaged
population groups, etc.). The alternative is to improve public processes and to create a
flexible (government) approach that is not market-based. If one opts for government
implementation, it is important to learn from the advantages of market-based
programs, e.g., using a “short route” of accountability by making implementation
agents more responsive to the learners’ needs, as well as making flexible programs
that are not implemented in a top-down manner.

7. Conclusion
The use of public-private partnerships has both a positive and a negative impact on
the content of literacy training. In Senegal for example, one positive result of the
public-private partnerships was that they gave small civil society providers access to
decent financing to conduct literacy activities. These small associations previously
had few means to implement high-quality literacy and development activities and
could only set up a few courses which lacked materials. In many cases, the public
financing of the literacy classes led to improved service delivery. On the other hand,
most providers tried to earn more money for themselves by cutting costs. For
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example, in most public-private partnerships programs, the training of literacy
teachers is the providers’ responsibility. This part of the literacy provision is
important, since the quality of the literacy course is greatly dependent on the quality
of the teaching. Most providers do not invest sufficiently or do not have the capacity
to train the literacy teachers to become good teachers (Nordtveit, 2005). Several other
quality-related problems were associated with the providers’ cutting back on costs to
save money, and the state’s inability (and in some cases, unwillingness) to control the
sector.
The results of a longitudinal study in Senegal show that in projects using partnerships,
lessons on income-generating activities generally obtained better results than lessons
on literacy. In most cases the providers were able to adapt basic skills and incomegenerating courses to the local situation in a way that may have been difficult for the
government. As for literacy, the outcome of the courses was reduced to acquisition of
knowledge on how to use the telephone and of writing small notes (Nordtveit, 2005).
One particular result in Senegal of the use of public-private partnerships is that the
providers trained local women in leadership and management. In particular, the
providers created local management committees that were supervising the literacy
classes. In Senegal, the providers also offered leadership training to the management
committee, and sometimes helped them organizing the learners into becoming a
legally recognized for-profit association. Such for-profit association sometimes
continues collective income-generating activities that were learned during the literacy
course, and are therefore a tool to sustain literacy and income-generating activities in
the communities. Some of these for-profit associations have also become literacy
providers in their own right.
Most countries using the public-private partnerships have targeted the literacy
initiatives at women.6 In Senegal, for example, about 80% of the enrollees are
women. The gathering of women for literacy classes has a social impact insomuch as
it strengthens the women’s solidarity and relationship in the village (Nordtveit, 2005).

6

The provision of women-oriented literacy courses is not a specific feature of PPPs, but is general for
most literacy programs.
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Also, the organization of women in for-profit organizations improves the production
of goods and agricultural products in many communities.
Additionally, many courses are reported to have a positive impact on local health,
hygiene, and strengthened local income (DAEB, 2003). In most cases, it is unclear to
which extent the outcomes of the literacy projects were strengthened or weakened
through the use of public-private partnerships. In reviewing the outcomes of the
World Bank financed Women’s Literacy Project in Senegal, it was noted that publicprivate partnerships “decreased the quality of learning through the use of cost-cutting
practices, but it also strengthened the learning (especially on basic skills and incomegeneration activities) through offering courses that were more relevant to the local
communities” (Nordtveit, 2005, p. 423).

21

NORDTVEIT/EFA 2006/PPP

Bibliography
Abadzi, H. (2003). Improving adult literacy outcomes: lessons from cognitive
research for developing countries. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Azfar, O., & Zinnes, C. (2003). Success By Design: The Science of Self-Evaluating
Projects. NIE-Based Toolkit for USAID Applications, IRIS-USAID.
Bhola, H. S. "Literacy Campaigns: A Policy Perspective." In Wagner, D.A., Venezky,
R.L. & Street, B.V. (1999). Literacy: an international handbook. Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press.
Carnoy, M. & Samoff, J. (1990). Education and social transition in the Third World.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Cohen, J.L. & Arato, A. (1992). Civil society and political theory. Studies in
contemporary German social thought. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
DAEB, Longitudinal study, 3 reports: LS-T0 (2001), LS-T1 (2002), and LS-T1.2
(2003) .
DAEB. (2004). Etude d’Impact (draft report).
Easton, P. (2004). Enhancing the Contributions of Adult and Non-formal Education
to Achievement of Education for All and Millennium Development Goals: Volume I
Finding Improved Means of Service Provision in Adult and Non-formal Education.
World Bank report.
Edinvest. (Non dated, CD-Rom). Public-private Partnership Toolkit. International
Finance Corporation.
Freire, p. (2001). Pedagogy of Freedom: Ethics, Democracy, and Civic Courage.
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Furubotn, E. G. & Richter, R. (2003). Institutions and Economic Theory: The
Contributions of the New Institutional Economics. The University of Michigan Press.

22

NORDTVEIT/EFA 2006/PPP

Harper, M. (2000). Public Services through Private Enterprise: Micro-Privatisation
for Improved Delivery. Intermediate Technology Publications.
IMF/Fiscal Affairs Dept. (2004). Public-Private Partnerships.
Kasper, W. & Streit, M.E. (1998). Institutional economics: social order and public
policy. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
Krishna, A. (2002). Active social capital: tracing the roots of development and
democracy. New York: Columbia University Press.
MOE/DAEB/PAPF. (2000). Manuel de Procédures pour l’Expérimentation des
Programmes Intégrés d’Education des Adultes, 2000-2002. Dakar : Groupe SIFNI.
Nordtveit, B. H. (2004). Managing Public-private Partnerships: Lessons from
Literacy Education in Senegal (2004). Africa Region Human Development Working
Paper Series – No. 72. Washington DC: World Bank.
Nordtveit, B. H. (2005). The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Developing
Countries: A Case Study of Public-Private Partnerships in Senegal. Dissertation,
University of Maryland. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/1903/2193
Printz, M. (1996). L’Alphabétisation au Sénégal. L’Harmattan.
Putnam, R.D. (2000). Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American
community. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Schleifer, A. (1998). State Versus Private Ownership. NBER Working Paper Series.
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6665
Thiané, A. (1996). Les ONG, Une Panacé…? Saint-Louis, Senegal: Xamail Editions.
Todaro, M.P. & Smith, S.C. (2003). Economic development. 8th ed. The AddisonWesley series in economics., Boston: Addison Wesley.
World Bank. (1996). Staff Appraisal Report. Report No. 15517-SE. World Bank,
Washington DC.

23

NORDTVEIT/EFA 2006/PPP

World Bank/Guinea NFE Unit (2002). Draft Procedures Manual for Guinea Literacy
Project Component. Work paper.
World Bank. (2003). Making Services Work for Poor People. World Development
Report, 2004. World Bank/Oxford University Press.
World Bank/ ANFEU/Gambia (2005). Draft Procedures Manual for The Gambia
Literacy Project Component. Work paper.
World Bank. (2004). Implementation Completion Report. Report No. 27339 SE.
World Bank, Washington DC.

24

